Article V

Writing in the last Federalist, the series of articles designed to explain the new Constitution and aid its ratification, Alexander Hamilton addressed the suspicion expressed by some Anti-Federalists that those who gained power under the new Constitution would resist any changes that might restrain their powers. He pointed out that the states retained potential leverage over the national government through the amendment process.

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments it has been urged, that the person delegated to the administration of the national government, will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on the other account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen states at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion, con­stantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this, that the national rulers, whenever nine states concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan the congress will be obliged, “on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states (which at present amounts to nine) to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of threefourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof.” The words of this article are peremptory. The congress “shall call a convention.” Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about their disinclination to a change, vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two-thirds or threefourths of the state leg­islature, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people.We may safely rely on the disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers against encroachment of the national authority.